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Abstract 
 
We examine the merger announcements of Canadian companies between 1994 and 2000 during 
an exceptional merger boom. Our results show that both target companies and the acquirer com-
panies obtain significant positive abnormal returns at this time period.  However, in the long run, 
we observe that abnormal returns diminish to become significant and negative for acquiring 
companies and diminish to be non-significant and positive for target companies.  We find acquir-
ing companies to have significantly higher risk that purchase private targets compared with pub-
lic targets, despite non-significant differences in returns.  Our large sample study updates and 
fills a void in Canadian merger studies during this important and recent time period in merger 
and acquisitions. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
he study of mergers and acquisitions focuses on understanding what motivates managers to engage in 
this type of activity and the impact that mergers and acquisitions have on shareholder returns.  Mergers 
and acquisitions are an important means to grow a company. Managers’ motivations for mergers could 
be empire building through growth in size, (Mueller, 1969) sales and assets (Berle and Means, 1932) (Schipper and 
Thompson, 1983).  Managers choose to merge or acquire with others for potential market gains, for overcoming 
technological barriers, and for gaining a technological edge, as well as for building diversification on existing 
strengths. Managers are also pursuing efficiency improvements through mergers and acquisitions.  Efficiency im-
provements can be gained from synergy of target and bidding firms due to economies of scale and use of excess ca-
pacity.  For example, vertical mergers create economies of scale by enabling more efficient coordination of the 
members of the vertical chain.    Berry (2000) and Williamson (1971) further promotes that vertical mergers increase 
shareholder returns by creating internal transfer pricing transactions.  Managers may pursue mergers and acquisi-
tions to lower the cost of capital and improve shareholder returns.  They may see that acquisitions can reduce the 
probability of default due to the co-insurance effect (Lewellen, 1971) thus reducing bankruptcy costs and increasing 
the debt capacity of the combined firm.  By increasing debt capacity, a manager can reduce the cost of capital 
through interest tax shields and add value to the firm.  Levy and Sarnat (1970) support this managerial motivation.  
They find that in conglomerate mergers, large firms enjoy significant cost savings when securing their financing 
needs.  These cost savings presumably reflect, at least in part, the reduction in lenders’ risk achieved through diver-
sification. However, recent studies (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Maquieira, Megginson and Nail 
(1998)) challenge value creation in conglomerate mergers; that there are no synergies created through diversification 
or horizontal mergers.   
 
For the above motivations and more, Canadian managers are very active in mergers and acquisitions be-
tween 1994 and 2000.  We examine the impact of mergers on Canadian shareholder returns.  In contrast to US stu-
dies of shareholder returns, Canadian studies appear to consistently show positive and significant returns to acquir-
ing firm shareholders.  Differences in Canadian industry, capital markets and regulations appear to justify the differ-
ence in the Canadian experience.  Yet, the Canadian studies are few and more evidence is needed; this paper pro-
vides the most current evidence from the recent worldwide merger boom of the 1990’s-2000.  Moreover, we go fur-
ther than existing studies to examinine the impact of acquiring public vs. private companies on shareholder returns. 
T 
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The first part of the paper summarizes the key research findings from the literature on mergers and acquisi-
tions.  We then formulate our hypotheses, describe the sample of firms, data acquisition, and analytical methodology 
and present our results.  We conclude the paper with a discussion of directions for further research. 
 
 
2.  Previous Studies 
 
Various researchers (Dodd (1980), Dennis and McConnell (1986)) conclude that as a result of merger, the 
returns go to target firms.  Returns to target shareholders range from 20-30 % (Dodd and Ruback (1977), Dodd 
(1980), Bradley and Wakeman (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Malatesta (1983)). On the other hand, the impact 
of merger on returns for the acquiring firms has largely been either significant negative abnormal returns (Dodd 
(1980), Firth (1980), and Eger (1983)) or non-significant positive abnormal returns. (Asquith (1983), Eckbo (1983), 
Dennis and McConnell (1986) and Amihud, Dodd and Weinstein (1986)). 
 
Travlos (1987) studies the impact of form of payment made by an acquiring firm on shareholder returns in 
a merger.  He finds significant differences in abnormal returns between acquirers making stock-exchange offers ver-
sus cash offers.  That is, acquirers making cash offers achieve normal returns; whereas, acquirers making stock-
exchange offers achieve abnormal negative returns.  Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988) explain “equity in acquisitions 
conveys bad news, while cash conveys good news”.  Indeed, Travlos (1987) also supports this information signaling 
hypotheses to explain different returns for acquiring firms making cash offers versus stock offers. 
 
The method of merger also has an impact on shareholder returns.  Tender offers are made directly to com-
pany shareholders for a controlling stake of the company.  These tend to be unfriendly takeovers.  Merger offers are 
negotiated between top management of the acquiring and target companies; these tend to be friendly takeovers 
(Bruner, 2002).  Jensen and Ruback (1983) find that shareholders of target firms in tender offers receive about twice 
the returns of those receiving merger offers.  Tender offers do pay. 
 
While most event studies on the impact of mergers on shareholder returns are done in North America, there 
is also similar evidence around the world.  Doukas and Travlos (1988) examine the impact of international mergers 
and acquisitions on U.S. company shareholder returns.  Their findings are interesting because studies on domestic 
acquisitions often find non-significant positive returns for the acquiring firm; it is the target firm that receives the 
abnormal returns.  In contrast, they find that when a U.S. company acquires a company in another country, signifi-
cant and positive returns are gained.  These abnormal returns are larger when firms expand into new industry and 
geographic markets – especially with those countries that are less developed than the U.S. economy.  Further re-
search of Manzon, Sharp and Travlos (1994) find that the abnormal returns to U.S. companies making international 
acquisitions are related to tax differences in the international tax status of acquiring firms. 
 
Looking at foreign companies buying U.S. companies, such mergers and acquisitions result in significant 
and positive returns to shareholders of both acquiring and target company shareholders. (Eun, Kolodny, and Schera-
ga, 1996) Shareholders of the U.S. target companies earn significant wealth gains regardless of the nationality of 
foreign acquirers.  In particular, their study show that Japanese acquisitions generate the largest wealth gains to both 
target and acquiring company shareholders.  A compelling motivation for foreign managers was gaining the U.S. 
target firms R&D capabilities and access to a more lucrative US market. 
 
The Canadian experience of merger studies date back to 1983.  Consistent with the research on mergers and 
acquisitions in the United States, Canadian studies also show that target firms gain more than acquirers.  On average, 
gains are 9-23% for target firms.  Eckbo (1986), Calvet and Lefoll (1987) using Canadian monthly data, find that 
mergers result in significant gains for shareholders of acquiring and target firms.  Masse, Hanrahan and Kushner 
(1988), using daily data, find that the timing of the gains is focused in the month prior to the merger announcement 
date.  Masse, Hanrahan and Kushner (1990) conclude that the type of acquisition and method of payment do affect 
the shareholder returns for both the target and acquiring firms.  They find shareholders of both target and acquiring 
companies receive gains. Shareholders of acquiring firms earn considerably less returns than those of target firms, 
both in tender and in merger offers.  For target firms, tender offers pay double the returns to shareholders than mer-
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ger offers.  The previous studies do show similarities in results with U.S. studies. Yet, Canadian studies and the in-
dustry do differ from the U.S. for these important respects.  First, studies in Canada report positive and significant 
gains to acquiring companies; whereas, most merger studies on US companies report significant negative or non-
significant returns to acquiring companies  (Bruner, 2002).  Second, Canadian capital markets, industries and com-
panies are much smaller than the US.  Canada is about one tenth the size in population as the United States.  Third, 
“Canadian industrial markets are characterized by fewer firms and greater concentration of output relative to the 
U.S. markets” (Eckbo, 1992).  He finds that the mean industry concentration ratio is 48% in Canada and 33% in the 
U.S. for horizontal mergers.  Finally, anti-trust laws are more developed and strict in the U.S. compared to Canada. 
Eckbo, 1992 points out that the enforcement of anti-trust policy since the 1950’s “significantly deter horizontal mer-
ger activity” in the United States.  On the other hand, Canada has fewer regulations on mergers and acquisitions up 
until 1985. Hence, for the reasons that Canadian and U.S. industry, capital markets and regulations do differ, that 
Canadian studies on M&A are justifiably different from U.S. studies. 
 
Since the 1980’s decade of merger activity, there has been a worldwide merger boom.  Pryor (2001) cha-
racterizes this merger boom in the 1990’s as a distinct decade of mergers from the 1980’s in the US, Canada and 
OECD countries.  Indeed, in the 1990’s, we witness some spectacular merger activities such as the frenetic initial 
public offerings and subsequent acquisitions of multitudes of dot.com companies, the prominence of global business 
and transnational mergers, and unprecedented mega-merger deals such as the 165 billion AOL-Time Warner deal.  
Quantitatively, Pryor (2001) estimates that between 1992 and 1999, the total recorded value of merger deals grew at 
an annual rate of 35.7 percent, and from 1985 to 1999, the total volume of mergers rose at 20.8 percent annually.  In 
addition to the increases in the total value and volume dimensions of merger activities, Pryor (2001) also notes the 
increasing importance of the mega-deals of global companies’ mergers.  There has been an important shift in merger 
activities to other industries since the 1980’s.  “The focus of mergers has shifted from a predominance in manufac-
turing and mining to other sectors, particularly communications, financial, and services” (Pryor, 2001).  Moreover, 
he finds that the type of merger, conglomerate, vertical and horizontal, has shifted in the 1990’s.  Prior to the merger 
boom in 1985, he observes that vertical and conglomerate mergers are dominant.  After the merger boom since 
1985, horizontal mergers are clearly dominant. The dot.com bubble is also noteworthy of the late 1990’s as we won-
der about its merger implications.   
 
The 1990’s is also a time when global business emerged to prominence particularly with the establishment 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994.  In this regard, “the worldwide shares of merger activity in 
Canada and the United States have noticeably decreased, while the share of merger activity in the OECD nations 
have considerably increased”  (Pryor, 2001).  Finally, to truly understand the exceptional nature of this merger 
boom, Pryor (2001) finds this merger boom to be greater than any other merger boom in past U.S. history.  He notes 
that this merger boom is much greater (measured in terms of number) than previous merger booms with peaks 
around 1900, 1929, 1963 and the early 1980’s (Golbe and White, 1993).   
 
Given this extraordinary period of mergers in the 1990’s, there is reason to believe in changes in the return 
patterns to acquirer and target companies over time.  Bruner, 2002 observes that there is “a slight tendency for re-
turns to decline over time: returns appear to be higher (more positive) in the 1960’s and 1970’s than in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s, except for deals in technology and banking, where returns to bidders increase in the 1990s.” As is also 
reported by Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988 that average announcement returns to acquirers fell from 4.1% in the 
1963 to 1968 period, to –2.9% in the 1981-1984 period.  These suggest that there is a temporal effect on M&A per-
formance.  While there are numerous empirical studies done in the 1990’s in the U.S., there are few done in Canada 
between 1990-2001.  These few studies deserve mention; there are two. Eckbo (1992) uses Canadian merger data 
from 1964 to 1982 in his article, “Mergers and the Value of Antitrust Deterrence”. Jabbour, Jalilvand, and Switzer 
(2000) uses Canadian merger data from 1985-1995 in their article, “Pre-bid price run-ups and insider trading activi-
ty: Evidence from Canadian acquisitions”.  Our paper examines a sample period of 1994-2000.  In times of a merger 
boom, we hypothesize that mergers and acquisitions create significant and positive returns to shareholders of both 
acquirer and target companies.  There is money to be made in mergers during this booming and prosperous period of 
mergers unlike other time periods. Recall, that many previous studies report significant and negative returns or non-
significant returns to acquiring company shareholders.  Our paper serves to fill a void in the empirical work in Can-
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ada that are largely done in the 1980’s to gain insight of a unique worldwide merger boom that occurred between 
1985 and the end of the millennium. 
 
We also examine the impact of merging or acquiring public versus private companies on returns to share-
holders of acquiring firms.  Can the market value acquisitions differently under asymmetric information conditions?  
These conditions exist when acquiring firms buy privately owned companies in which the acquiring firm knows far 
more information about the private company than the market.  Unlike publicly traded companies, which provide ac-
cessible company information to market investors, private companies provide no such information.  Hence, asym-
metric information about the value of a private target company exists between the acquirer and the market.  Under 
this condition then, are shareholders of acquiring companies rewarded any differently for acquiring private compa-
nies versus public companies?  This aspect is highly relevant to the reality of mergers and acquisitions because we 
find in our Canadian sample that the clear majority of acquired target companies were private companies. Further-
more, previous empirical studies seem to treat all acquirers, whether they bought public or private companies, with 
the resulting return patterns as the same.  We hypothesize that there would be a difference in returns between ac-
quirers that buy publicly companies, and acquirers that buy private companies.   
 
 
3.  Hypotheses Testing: 
 
We test the following hypotheses for the merger announcements.  First we examine whether mergers and 
acquisitions create abnormal returns for the target company shareholders: 
 
H1: Ha = Mergers and acquisitions do create positive and significant abnormal returns for target company 
shareholders. 
 
Second, we test whether mergers and acquisitions create abnormal returns for the acquiring companies: 
 
H2: Ha = Mergers and acquisitions do create significant and positive or negative abnormal returns for acquiring 
company shareholders. 
 
Third, we examine whether private targets create significant and different returns than public ones for ac-
quiring companies: 
 
H3: Ha = Private targets and Public targets create significant and different returns for acquirers. 
 
 
4.  Event Study Methodology 
 
4.1.  Measurement 
 
Event studies examine the impact of merger announcements on abnormal returns to shareholders.  The in-
dependent variable is defined as the time surrounding the merger announcement date, and we chose to measure 40 
days before and 40 days after a merger announcement date. The dependant variable is defined as abnormal return.  
First raw returns are calculated for each day, which is the change in share price and any dividends paid, divided by 
the closing share price the day before.  (Bruner, 2002)  The abnormal return is simply the raw return less a bench-
mark return of a large stock index such as the TSE-300.  The abnormal return, ARj,t is defined as follows: 
 
tbmtjtj RRAR ,,,   (1) 
 
where Rj,t is the daily stock return and Rbm is the benchmark portfolio return proxied by the total return on the TSE-
300 and represents the expected return of the stock in question.  Acquirer and target company share prices are ob-
tained from the DataStream database. The Toronto Stock Market Composite Total Return Index (TSE-300) is also 
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obtained from the DataStream database. Finally, the market model is used to calculate abnormal returns in the tradi-
tional form.  
 
Then, average abnormal returns are calculated as: 
 
The cumulative abnormal return from the first day to the trading day, s is given by the following formula: 
 


s
t
ts, AARCAR
1
1  (3) 
 
 
4.2.  Data 
 
We examine the short-term (40 day) performance of Canadian mergers between 1994-2000. All Canadian 
mergers over this 6-year period are examined. The announcement dates, as well as auditor, investment banker and 
issue specific information is obtained from the Lexus Nexus database.  As a basic criterion, companies first have to 
be publicly traded and have sufficient time series price data on Datastream.  Some data are screened out because of 
the following reasons: 1- The stock is in the regional market, 2- the stock has not traded continuously, and 3- the 
companies are in the financial industry.  Financial firms experience different return patterns than those of non-
financial companies.   Table 1 summarizes the number of companies examined in our sample. 
 
 
Table 1 
Sample Statistics of Canadian Public Companies in Mergers and Acquisitions, 1994-2000 
 
 Acquiring Companies Target Companies 
Total Number of Listed Companies  1565 281 
Less Financial Service Companies -204 -39 
Number of Companies Reported  1361 242 
Average Transaction Value $ 150,005,434 $ 284,143,753 
Percent Positive Returns 53% (CAR 0,2) 
41% (CAR0,30) 
61% 
 
 
As shown in Table 1, as a result of meeting our criteria, we are able to calculate returns on 1361 acquirer 
companies and 242 target companies.  We acknowledge that there are far more Canadian acquiring companies com-
pared with target companies.  As we are examining publicly traded companies, it appears that the majority of Cana-
dian target companies acquired were not publicly traded.  The Percent Positive Returns shows the percentage of ac-
quiring and target companies that show positive returns during the merger period of CAR(0,2).  It appears that more 
target company shareholders earn positive returns compared with acquiring company shareholders. 
 
4.3.  Analysis 
 
To accept or reject our hypotheses in this event study, we use the t-statistic to test for significance at the al-
pha = .05 level.  In our first hypothesis, we hypothesize that targets will earn positive abnormal returns given that 
most studies have found this result.  Consequently, we perform a one-tail t-test on our abnormal returns for signifi-
cant differences.  Because previous studies show that acquirers earn negative or positive returns, we perform a two-
tail t-test on abnormal returns for significant differences.  In testing our third hypothesis that there would be differ-
n
AR
AAR
n
j
tj
t



1
, )(
(2) 
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ences in returns to acquiring company shareholders as a result of purchasing private versus public targets, we use a 
two-tail t-test to compare abnormal return differences. 
 
 
5.  Results and Interpretation 
 
5.1.  Performance of Target Firms 
 
We examine abnormal returns for 242 target companies’ shareholders between 1994 and 2000 as shown in 
Table II and cumulative abnormal returns for the same shareholders in Table III.  We find that target firm sharehold-
ers start earning significant excess returns as early as 2 weeks, on days -14 and –16 before the merger announcement 
day.  Three days before the announcement day, the abnormal returns are also significant and positive at 0.96%.  The 
abnormal returns are 0.57 and 0.82% respectively on days –2 and –1; however, they are statistically non-significant. 
However, on the day of announcement, a significant and relatively large abnormal return is found, which is 4.42% 
mean abnormal return to target shareholders.  There is also significant positive abnormal return, 1.19% two days af-
ter the announcement day.  
 
As shown in Table III and Figure 1, our holding period returns or Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR), 
also support our alternate hypothesis that significant and positive abnormal returns go to target shareholders.  The 
significant and positive CAR’s have a range from 4.00 percent to 9.53 percent.  The cumulative abnormal return for 
target companies within two day holding period (CAR 0,2) is 6.31%, and this number goes as high as 8.73% for ten 
day holding period (CAR-5,5) beginning 5 days before the announcement day. Ten-day holding period starting from 
the announcement period (CAR 0,10) produces 4.00% abnormal return. Abnormal returns become non-significant 
for a three-week horizon; however, they never become negative for target company shareholders. 
 
Table II 
Target Company Abnormal Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event 
Day 
Abnormal 
Return t-statistic 
 Event 
Day 
Abnormal 
Return t-statistic 
-20 0.40% 0.85  1 0.70% 1.14 
-19 -0.17% -0.41  2 1.19% 2.33* 
-18 -0.17% -0.36  3 -0.63% -1.30 
-17 -0.77% -1.45  4 0.38% 0.84 
-16 0.92% 2.20*  5 -0.40% -0.86 
-15 0.18% 0.44  6 -0.22% -0.58 
-14 0.90% 2.02*  7 -0.15% -0.40 
-13 -0.36% -0.73  8 0.26% 0.76 
-12 0.47% 1.17  9 -0.61% -1.35 
-11 0.61% 1.14  10 -0.94% -0.73 
-10 -0.63% -1.48  11 -0.92% -1.91* 
-9 0.79% 1.84*  12 0.07% 0.18 
-8 0.19% 0.49  13 -0.17% -0.42 
-7 0.10% 0.31  14 0.28% 0.76 
-6 -0.01% -0.03  15 0.41% 1.19 
-5 0.81% 1.82*  16 -0.05% -0.12 
-4 -0.08% -0.20  17 -0.19% -0.43 
-3 0.96% 2.06*  18 -0.14% -0.35 
-2 0.57% 1.26  19 -0.40% -1.16 
-1 0.82% 1.66*  20 0.20% 0.58 
0 4.42% 3.85*     
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*  = Statistically significant at 0.05 level 
or less for a one-sided t-test 
 
Table III 
Target Company Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Daily CAR’s for Canadian Target Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.  Performance of Acquiring Firms 
 
We find abnormal returns for 1361 acquiring companies’ shareholders as shown in Table IV and cumula-
tive abnormal returns for the same shareholders in Table V and Figure 2.   Our evidence supports positive abnormal 
returns. Abnormal returns start to be significant two days before the announcement. On the announcement day, 
shareholders of the acquirers experience 1.09% positive excess return.  Shareholders continue their earnings with 
0.53% excess return the day after the announcement. Two days after the takeover announcement shareholder returns 
turn into negative range, although negative returns become significant only four days after the announcement. 
 
As shown in Table V and Figure 2, our holding period returns or Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR), al-
so justify our alternate hypothesis that significant and positive abnormal returns go to acquirer shareholders in the 
first week.  The shareholders of the acquiring firms earn a total of 2.01% excess returns within days –2 and  +2.  Be-
tween the announcement day and the 2 days after (CAR 0,2), they earn 1.41%. However after the first week returns 
become negative.  These abnormal returns become non-significant at the end of the first week and significant and 
negative at three weeks and four weeks.   
Table IV 
CAR Range 
Abnormal 
Return t statistic 
CAR(-5,5) 8.73% 4.832* 
CAR(-2,2) 7.69% 5.131* 
CAR(0,2) 6.31% 4.676* 
CAR(0,5) 5.66% 3.600* 
CAR(0,10) 4.00% 1.989* 
CAR(0,20) 3.09% 1.315 
CAR(0,30) 2.01% 0.728 
CAR(-10,10) 7.51% 3.131* 
CAR(-40,40) 9.53% 2.190* 
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Acquirer Company Abnormal Returns 
 
Event 
Day 
Abnormal 
Return 
 
t-statistic 
 Event 
Day 
Abnormal 
Return 
 
t-statistic 
-20 -0.16% -0.733  1 0.53% 3.148* 
-19 0.34% 1.208  2 -0.21% -1.430 
-18 -0.01% -0.076  3 -0.27% -1.598 
-17 -0.11% -0.590  4 -0.44% -2.977* 
-16 0.08% 0.523  5 -0.32% -2.620* 
-15 0.03% 0.186  6 0.02% 0.139 
-14 0.07% 0.368  7 -0.38% -2.595* 
-13 0.32% 1.463  8 -0.41% -2.794* 
-12 0.17% 1.380  9 0.09% 0.702 
-11 0.10% 0.741  10 -0.46% -3.105* 
-10 0.09% 0.431  11 0.09% 0.489 
-9 0.02% 0.099  12 -0.16% -1.256 
-8 -0.08% -0.657  13 0.02% 0.172 
-7 0.20%  1.427  14 -0.15% -1.110 
-6 0.03%  0.227  15 -0.40% -2.778* 
-5 0.19%  1.294  16 -0.22% -1.644 
-4 0.09%  0.694  17 -0.06% -0.418 
-3 0.00% -0.012  18 -0.06% -0.454 
-2 0.35%  2.226*  19 -0.15% -1.009 
-1 0.25%  1.547  20 0.21%  1.301 
0 1.09%  4.650*     
 
 
Table V 
Acquirer Company Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
CAR Range Abnormal 
Return 
t statistic 
CAR(-5,5) 1.27% 2.869* 
CAR(-2,2) 2.01% 4.919* 
CAR(0,2) 1.41% 4.764* 
CAR(0,5) 0.39% 1.113 
CAR(0,10) -0.76% -1.689 
CAR(0,20) -1.63% -2.269* 
CAR(0,30) -3.73% -3.653* 
CAR(-10,10) 0.38% 0.618 
CAR(-40,40) -2.32% -0.960 
 
 
 
* = Statistically significant at 0.05 level 
or less for a two-sided t-test 
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Figure 2 
Daily CAR’s for Canadian Acquiring Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     C:  Performance of Acquirers buying Private versus Public Targets 
 
 
We are able to separate our 1361 acquiring companies to two groups: 1261 companies, which bought pub-
licly traded targets, and 90 companies which bought private targets.   As shown in Table VII, there appears to be no 
difference in the number of acquirers between these groups on the percent positive returns.  We find abnormal re-
turns for these two groups of acquiring companies’ shareholders as shown in Table VI and cumulative abnormal re-
turns for the same shareholders in Table VII.  As shown in Table VI and VII, we find our p-values to be insufficient-
ly low enough, so we fail to reject our null hypothesis that there is no difference in returns.  That is, we find insuffi-
cient evidence that mergers with private versus public companies result in different returns.  The market seems to be 
unable to reward private versus public mergers differently.  On the other hand, we find significant differences in the 
risk of the returns between acquirers who bought private versus public companies.    As shown in Table VII, acquir-
ers that bought private targets had significantly (at 0.01 level) higher standard deviations in returns than acquirers 
that bought public targets.  For example, in CAR 0 to 30 days, the standard deviation is twice as high for acquiring 
public targets.  This shows that there is more risk for an acquiring company to buy a private company than a public 
company.  Indeed, without public involvement in the valuation and assessment of a private company, it makes sense 
that such acquiring companies face uncertainty in pricing the target and face a certain risk of poor valuation and 
overpaying for a company.  Hence, we find support for information efficiency theory in that acquiring public targets 
have less risk in returns than acquiring private targets due to public availability of information about public targets. 
 
We assert that these findings make a noteworthy contribution as most acquisitions, whether in the U.S. or 
Canada, are of private targets, and previous Canadian studies have not examined this aspect. 
 
       
-3.00%
-2.00%
-1.00%
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
-40 -34 -28 -22 -16 -10 -4 2 8 14 20 26 32 38
Days Around Merger Event 
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 
A
b
n
o
rm
a
l 
R
e
tu
rn
s
Journal Of Business & Economics Research  Volume 1, Number 11 
 16 
Table VI 
Difference in Mean Abnormal Returns between acquiring private targets versus public targets 
 
 Acquirers of Acquirers of t-test: difference in 
 Private Targets Public Targets Mean Returns 
Day n Mean AR Std Dev n Mean AR Std Dev t Value Pr > |t| 
-16 1271 0.02% 5.79% 90 1.02% 5.17% -1.76 0.0808 
-15 1271 0.16% 6.39% 90 -1.80% 11.37% 1.61 0.1105 
-14 1271 -0.01% 6.59% 90 1.18% 5.82% -1.86 0.0652 
-13 1271 0.03% 5.31% 90 4.37% 24.05% -1.71 0.0909 
-12 1271 0.12% 4.41% 90 0.79% 4.63% -1.33 0.1879 
-11 1271 0.05% 4.92% 90 0.82% 6.20% -1.15 0.2511 
-10 1271 -0.05% 4.88% 90 2.01% 22.61% -0.86 0.3908 
-9 1271 0.16% 5.54% 90 -2.00% 10.68% 1.87 0.0647 
-8 1271 -0.10% 4.56% 90 0.61% 6.39% -1.08 0.2827 
-7 1271 0.26% 4.58% 90 -0.60% 11.20% 0.76 0.4512 
-6 1271 -0.02% 4.91% 90 0.84% 10.16% -0.80 0.4283 
-5 1271 0.15% 5.28% 90 0.79% 6.85% -0.87 0.3850 
-4 1271 0.13% 4.74% 90 -0.40% 7.21% 0.69 0.4945 
-3 1271 0.01% 4.56% 90 -0.10% 6.14% 0.21 0.8315 
-2 1271 0.23% 5.45% 90 2.13% 9.83% -1.82 0.0726 
-1 1271 0.18% 5.17% 90 1.22% 12.55% -0.78 0.4355 
0 1271 0.99% 6.44% 90 2.37% 23.20% -0.56 0.5773 
1 1271 0.46% 6.00% 90 1.47% 8.70% -1.08 0.2820 
2 1271 -0.10% 4.75% 90 -1.20% 11.13% 0.88 0.3805 
3 1271 -0.20% 4.41% 90 -1.80% 17.37% 0.88 0.3793 
4 1271 -0.40% 4.89% 90 -0.60% 10.32% 0.19 0.8524 
5 1271 -0.20% 4.23% 90 -1.50% 6.77% 1.80 0.0755 
 
 
Table VII 
Difference between acquirers of private targets  
versus public targets for mean holding period returns and Standard Deviations 
Holding Acquirers of Acquirers of Difference in Difference in 
Returns Private Targets Public Targets Mean Returns Standard Deviation 
CAR’s n Mean AR Std Dev n Mean AR Std Dev t Value Pr > |t| F Value Pr > F 
CAR(0,2) 1271 1.32% 9.66% 90 0.43% 8.76% 0.92 0.3598 1.22 0.2344 
CAR(-2,2) 1271 1.73% 11.27% 90 1.42% 8.82% 0.31 0.7562 1.63 0.0038* 
CAR(-5,5) 1271 1.19% 16.38% 90 2.14% 10.67% -0.78 0.4376 2.36 <0.0001* 
CAR(0,10) 1271 -0.60% 16.00% 90 0.05% 12.24% -0.49 0.6246 1.71 0.0016* 
CAR(0,5) 1271 0.50% 12.38% 90 0.35% 12.46% 0.11 0.9129 1.01 0.9056 
CAR(0,20) 1271 -1.80% 26.61% 90 -0.90% 14.80% -0.49 0.6222 3.23 <0.0001* 
CAR(0,30) 1271 -3.70% 38.43% 90 -2.50% 19.32% -0.51 0.6099 3.96 <0.0001* 
CAR(-10,10) 1271 0.28% 23.05% 90 1.68% 15.93% -0.78 0.4399 2.09 <0.0001* 
CAR(-40,40) 1271 -2.90% 88.00% 90 -3.30% 33.39% 0.09 0.9249 6.94 <0.0001* 
Percent 
Positive 
CAR (0,2) 
51.1% 53.2% 
* Significance at .05 level or less with a two-sided t-test. 
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Conclusion 
 
We investigate the announcement effects of mergers and acquisitions on shareholders’ returns between 
1994 and 2000.  Our results show that both the target and the acquiring company shareholders earn significant and 
positive abnormal returns for two-day holding period starting with the announcement day. 
 
In the context of a worldwide merger boom during the 1990’s, we find that mergers and acquisitions have 
benefited both target and acquirer company shareholders.  It is consistent with many findings that mergers do pay.  
Despite the merger boom, the CAR returns of 9.53% to target shareholders that we find do not compare as high as 
the returns found in previous Canadian studies, which ranged from 9 to 23 percent.  Our acquirer sample of 1361 
acquiring companies is the largest sample for Canadian merger studies.  While we report positive abnormal returns 
for acquiring shareholders during the announcement, these positive returns are fleeting beyond five days after the 
announcement.  Returns after which become significant losses for acquiring shareholders.  This too, is consistent 
with studies reporting significant negative returns to acquiring shareholders.  We find that creating value for acquir-
ing shareholders is a 50-50 percent proposition, and the probability of succeeding diminishes soon, five days after 
announcement.  There are better chances of creating value for target shareholders, 61 percent.  For the business prac-
titioner, creating value through acquisition requires an understanding of what truly creates value and the ability to 
realize value paramount.  Bruner (2002) suggests “value is created by focus, relatedness and adherence to strategy.” 
 
Interestingly, we study the impact of acquiring public versus private targets on shareholder returns.  We 
explore the ability of the market to value acquisitions under asymmetric information conditions in which the public 
knows far less about the private target than does the acquirer.  We find non-significant differences in returns to ac-
quirers buying public versus target companies. This result is comparable with the findings of Chang, 1998.  He con-
cludes that there were indistinguishable returns between the purchase of private versus public targets with cash of-
fers.  Moreover, in stock offers, he finds significant differences: buying private targets earned positive abnormal re-
turns, and buying public targets earned negative abnormal returns. However, we find significantly higher risk for 
acquirers buying private targets versus public targets.  The implication for the executive is for him or her to value 
the risk and returns of acquisition of a private and public company differently.  Acquiring a private firm is more 
risky, and depending on the method of payment as found by Chang, 1998, does not pay more than acquiring a public 
company. 
 
Reflecting on some limitations of this study allows us to give direction to future research.  One limitation is 
that we examine one explanatory variable, which is acquisition of public versus private companies on shareholder 
returns. Another limitation is that we do not examine the impact of cash and stock payment on the different returns 
to acquirers buying private versus public targets. In the future, we will examine other explanatory variables on 
shareholder returns such as method of payment, type of merger, and financial performance. 
 
The consistent findings of gains to acquirers and targets found in Canadian studies still support the US stu-
dies and continue to be generalizable because there are also similarities between Canadian and US capital markets.  
Limits to generalizability of these findings include: Canada being a different country having different capital mar-
kets and a different time period.  We find that these differences justify our pursuit of this study.  Indeed, other coun-
tries undoubtedly have differences in capital markets, industry characteristics and regulations that pertain to mergers 
just like Canada does with the United States.  Hence, this study is generalizable to the extent that such country dif-
ferences do affect the impact of mergers on returns.  This paper provides a comprehensive update of the Canadian 
merger literature during this important period of 1994-2000.   
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